An analogy may illustrate this distinction: the case of 'fertility' of the soil. If we want to know whether a piece of land is well suited for growing grain, we can estimate the input that the soil provides or consider the output it has yielded earlier.
INTRODUCTION
When speaking about 'quality-of-life' in a nation we denote how well its citizens live. There are two ways to assess how well people live. One is to consider to what extent the country provides conditions deemed essential for a good life. In this approach the emphasis is on societal input. Since there is little certainty about what people really need, I call this 'presumed' quality-of-life. The other approach is to asses how well people thrive. In this approach the emphasis is on societal output 2 . I call this 'apparent' quality of life (Veenhoven 1996) .
'positive' mental health (Jahoda 1958) and again the quality-of-life in a nation is apparently better the less disturbed people are and the more positively they function.
There is nothing wrong with this idea, but there are great problems in its operationalization. It is not easy to establish who is mentally 'ill' or not. Cross-national comparison is hampered by differences in manifestations of psychological disturbance, as well as differences in what constitutes a definition of mental 'illness' and how it is registered. This limits the use of this indicator to countries, which are culturally very similar. The measurement of positive mental health is still in its infancy and doesn't allow any crossnational comparison at all.
Measures of happiness in nations
Next to mere 'functioning', the thriving of humans can also be inferred from their 'happiness'. Humans can comprehend their situation. Like other higher animals they experience affects. These affective appraisals are highly indicative for the quality-of-life. The biological function of these faculties is to lead the organism to the best-suited conditions 3. Positive affect is generally indicative of good adaptation. Contrary to other animals humans are also able to appraise their situation cognitively. Positive judgement of life is generally indicative of good adaptation.
The degree to which inhabitants of a nation feel happy can be assessed in different ways: indirectly by inferring from their behaviors and directly by asking how they feel about their life. Historically social scientists have preferred the former method. Today it is clear that only the latter is viable for this purpose.
Behavioral manifestations
Traditionally, the happiness of citizens in a nation was measured by the incidence of behaviors deemed indicative of despair. This approach does not require that people are fully aware of their malaise. Behavioral reactions can be affect driven or subconscious. Therefore, similar indicators are used for estimating the well-being in animals. Aggression, and self-mutilation and stereotypic behavior (i.e. pacing in a predetermined path back and forward by a caged lion) are often mentioned as indicative of despair in captive animals. Among wild animals migration can sometimes be seen as a way of escaping an increasingly inhostile environment. (i.e. the migration of game in response to the ruins in Africa)
Despair
Suicide rates are often used as an indicator of unhappiness in nations. This tradition dates back to Durkheim (1897). In this vein, the continuous rise of suicide in Western nations in the 20th century has been interpreted as showing that modernization reduces the quality-oflife.
There is probably some truth in the idea that general unhappiness gives rise to high suicide rates. Yet it is also clear that the incidence of suicide depends on many other things. In present day Western society, suicide rates may be rising because it is no longer taboo and because medical technology is used to postpone natural death. It is also possible that modern people are less willing to endure suffering. As in the case of other despair behaviors, these effects are not equally great in all societies at all times.
Protest and desert
Unhappiness is also seen to reflect in protest-behaviors, in purposeful political action (protest demonstrations, protest voting, etc) as well as in undirected rioting. In this line, the (Keniston 1968) . In fact, personal satisfaction may even facilitate engagement in social issues. Another thing, protests are typically concerned with specific aspects of society, and are therefore not very indicative of overall satisfaction with life. Emigration seems more indicative of happiness in a nation, the decision to leave a country involves an overall evaluation of life in it. In this vein, Ziegler & Britton (1981) showed that living conditions in emigration countries are typically poor. Yet, emigration may say more about opportunity to settle abroad than about the quality-of-life in the country, also, expectations about a better life elsewhere do not necessarily mean that the quality-of-life in one's home country is poor.
Self-reports
Though higher animals have the faculty of affective experience, they are typically unable to reflect on that experience and communicate it. We humans can. We can appraise how we feel about life and can communicate the estimate. When we appraise how much we like the life we live, we seem to use two sources of information. We estimate our typical affective experience to asses how well we feel generally (hedonic level of affect) and at the cognitive level we compare 'life as it is' with standards of 'how life should be' (contentment). The former affective source of information seems generally more important than the latter cognitive one (Veenhoven 1991 (Veenhoven , 1995 .
The word happiness is commonly used for these 'subtotals' and for the comprehensive appraisal. I use the terms 'overall' happiness or 'life-satisfaction' for the last judgement and refer to the affective and cognitive sub-appraisals respectively as 'hedonic level of affect' and 'contentment'. Elsewhere, these concepts are delineated in more detail (Veenhoven 1984: ch 2) . 
Survey questions on happiness

2.3
Measure of Happy-Life-Years Above we have seen that the best measure of health in nations is how long people live and that the best measure of happiness is self reported satisfaction with life-as-a-whole. Both measures are indicative of how well people thrive in a country, but neither of them captures this matter completely. One could at least imagine that people live long in a country but not
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happily, for instance because blind use of medical technology stretches out life and makes it too long. Likewise, one could imagine that people live happy in a country but not long, possibly as a result of too much indulgence. That problem is solved when these measures are combined. Analogous to the measure of 'Disability Adjusted Life Years' mentioned above, one could compute 'Happiness Adjusted Life Years'. Below I will show how. I call this measure Happy-Life-Years (HLY).
Computation
The number of years citizens live happily in a country can be measured by combining information about length of life drawn from civil registrations of birth and death with data on overall appreciation of life as assessed in surveys. The following simple formula can be applied:
Happy-Life-Years = Life-expectancy at birth x 0-1 happiness Suppose that life expectancy in a country is 50 years, and that the average score on a 0 to 10-step happiness scale is 5. Converted to a 0-1 scale, the happiness score is then 0.5. The product of 50 and 0.5 is 25. So the number of happy life years is 25 in this country. If life expectancy is 80 years and average happiness 8, the number of happy life years is 64 (80 x 0.8).
Theoretically, this indicator has a broad variation. The number of Happy Life Years is zero if nobody can live in a country, and infinity if society is ideal and its inhabitants immortal. The practical range will be between about 20 and 75 years. Presently at least, life expectancy at birth varies in nations between 30 and 80, whereas average happiness is seldom lower than 0.4 on a 0 to 1 scale and seldom higher than 0.8. The number of happyLife-Years will always be lower than standard life expectancy. It can equal real length of life only if everybody is perfectly happy in the country (score 1 on scale 0 to 1).
A high HLY means that citizens live both long and happily while a low HLY implies that the life of the average citizen is short and miserable. Medium HLY values can mean three things: 1) moderate length-of-lives and moderate appreciation-of-lives, 2) long but unhappy lives, and 3) short but happy lives.
In my opinion, this measure is the most comprehensive indicator of apparent quality of life in nations that we can have. The measure has also a clear meaning and appeals to common sense. Most people will agree that it is good to live long and happily. It is not for nothing that fairy tales end with sentiments like: they lived long and happy ever after.
I have described this indicator in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 1996 (Veenhoven , 2000 . It scored highest in a scholarly review of quality-of-life indicators for national policy (Hagerty e.a. 2001). 
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CROSS NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN HAPPY-LIFE-YEARS
TREND IN HAPPY-LIFE-YEARS
Time series are available for a few nations, for the USA since 1948, for Japan since 1958 and for the first member states of the European Union since 1973. All these nations have witnessed a rise in the number of happy-life-years. This is mainly because life expectancy has been augmented in all these nations, but in several cases HLY has also been boosted by a rise in average happiness. The most spectacular case of this kind is Italy, where HLY has risen by 12 years since 1973. Scheme 3 presents the longest available time series, that of the USA 1948-1998. Americans have gained 7 Happy-Life-Years over these 50 years. Since average happiness has remained at the same level over this period, this rise in HLY is entirely due to a rise in life expectancy. In this case, the proportional rise in HLY illustrates that this rise in length of life was not gained at the cost of lower quality of life. If the extra years of life had been spent in misery, HLY would have lagged or could even have declined.
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SOCIETAL CORRELATES OF HAPPPY-LIFE-YEARS
The next question is of course whether these differences in 'apparent' quality-of-life in nations have any correspondence with the earlier mentioned notions of 'assumed' qualityof-life. Is HLY higher in the nations that perform best on these standards? To answer that question I inspected the statistical relationship between HLY and five societal qualities that are currently seen as required for a good life. These qualities are: 1) material wealth, 2) freedom, 3) social equality, 4) solidarity, and 5) justice. The indicators used for this purpose are enumerated in appendix B.
The analysis involves three steps: The first step is to assess how each of these societal characteristics relates to HLY, to do this I plotted scattergrams and computed zero-order correlations. Next I inspected to what degree the observed correlations could be attributed to differences in economic development across nations. To do this I computed partial correlations, controlling for wealth of the country. Lastly I looked at how much of the variance in HLY across nations could be explained by these societal characteristics together. An overview is presented in scheme 4. I will expand on the main findings below.
Wealth
Until recently, quality-of-life in nations was equated with material prosperity and measured by GDP per capita. It is now acknowledged that money is not everything, but wealth is still prominent in quality-of-life indexes such as the Human Development Index (UNPD 2001) and Estes' (1984) Index of Social Progress. How does this hallmark of 'assumed' qualityof-life relate to our measure of 'apparent' quality-of-life?
The relationship between income per head and HLY in nations is presented in scheme 5. This scattergram shows a strong correspondence, the correlation coefficient is +.73. This result fits the common assumption that wealth is essential to quality-of-life. Yet with a closer look one can see that there is a limit to the benefits of material wealth. In the Ruut Veenhoven 7 Apparent QOL in nations scattergram one can recognize a curve of diminishing returns. The correlation is mainly in the left segment of the scattergram among nations with an income per capita below $ 15.000. There is little correlation among the richer nations (r = +.18).
Freedom
Opinion about the blessings of freedom is mixed. Individualistic social philosophy assumes that people themselves know best what they need, and hence that they will thrive better if they can follow their own preferences. Conservatives doubt that people really know what is best for them and rather stress the wisdom of tradition and experts. Some schools of thought see different effects of different variants of freedom. Currently the New Right is quite positive about economic freedom, but at the same time it is critical about freedom in the private sphere of life. Free sex and the legalization of soft drugs are seen to as a threat to the quality-of-life. Likewise a common view in South-East Asia is that economic freedom will improve the human lot but that political freedom will not. The relationship between political freedom and HLY is presented in scheme 6. Again we see a positive correlation, but the shape of the relationship is linear in this case, which suggests that freedom is not yet at its limit regarding its ability to confer quality-of-life. Similar patterns appear in the relationships of economic freedom and personal freedom to HLY. These findings support the liberal position. I have discussed this matter in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 1999 (Veenhoven , 2000b .
Free nations are typically also rich nations and hence the partial correlations in scheme 4 are considerably lower than the zero-order correlations. This could mean that the zeroorder correlations are largely spurious and that wealth is the main determinant of HLY. Yet is it also possible that freedom and wealth affect HLY equally much or that freedom affects HLY through its effects on the growth of wealth. Due to a lack of good time series data we cannot disentangle these effects as yet. For the time being, the partial correlations mark a minimum.
Equality
There is also a difference of opinion on the significance of social equality for the quality-oflife in nations. Egalitarians claim that social inequality is antithetical to quality-of-life, because it is morally unjust and because of its detrimental effects on self-respect and social bonds. Conservatives stress the positive functions of inequality and expect that enforced equality will go at the cost of quality-of-life. The discussion focuses very much on incomeequality. The evidence is mixed in this case, since not all kinds of equality relate in the same way to HLY. Surprisingly there is no statistical association with income inequality. The scattergram on scheme 7 shows that people live equally long and happy in nations with small income disparities, such as Japan, as in nations with great income differences, such as Mexico. Statistical control for wealth of the nations even suggests a positive effect of income inequality.
The correlation with inequality between males and females is more in line with egalitarian supposition; HLY being higher in nations were women are least discriminated. Yet the partial correlation is quite small, which could mean that gender equality works out to be less beneficial after all.
HLY relates most strongly with difference in happiness as measured by its standard deviation and this correlation remains robust after control for wealth of the nation. Elsewhere I have argued that social inequality in nations cannot be measured inclusively by Ruut Veenhoven 8 Apparent QOL in nations adding up differences in access to different matters and that the disparities in access to relevant resources (inputs) reflect best in the dispersion of happiness (output) See Veenhoven 2002. If I am right in this, these correlations mean that inequality still matters, though apparently not the specific inequalities that figure most prominently on the political agenda these days.
Solidarity
Next to freedom and equality, 'social solidarity' figured in the slogan of the French revolution (Liberté, egalité, fraternité), This and social solidarity is still seen as a prerequisite for a good life. In this analysis I considered two aspects of social solidarity in nations, one interpersonal respect and cooperation and two 'organized solidarity' in collective systems of social insurance. The indicators of interpersonal solidarity relate positively to HLY. The strongest correlation is with 'tolerance' as measured by acceptance of minority group members as a neighbor. There is also a positive correlation with self-reported trust in compatriots and with activity in voluntary organizations. All these correlations are largely independent of the wealth of the nation.
The case of 'organized solidarity' is different however. The zero-order correlation between social security expenditures and HLY is positive, but control for the wealth of a nation reveals a negative relationship. I have investigated this matter in more detail elsewhere and found indeed that people are not happier and healthier in nations with lavish social security systems than in equally rich nations where the providential state is less openhanded (Veenhoven 2000c ). Apparently we can live equally well in a residual welfare state. This finding illustrates that 'presumed' qualities of life do not always match 'apparent' quality-of-life.
Justice
Righteousness is also commonly mentioned as prerequisite for a good life. In this analysis I consider three indicators of justice in nations: rule of law, respect of civil liberties and prevalence of corruption. The relation between corruption and HLY is depicted in scheme 8.
The scattergram reveals a strong negative relationship with this aspect of injustice. The other indicators of justice in nations are also strongly related to HLY. See scheme 4. The partial correlations are also positive, but much smaller. As in the case of freedom this does not necessarily mean that the independent effect of justice is small, since the common variance of justice and wealth can be due to an effect of the former on the latter.
Explained variance
As a last step I considered how well these societal inputs predict the output of years lived happily. I limited that analysis to the variables for which we have at least 60 cases. This left me with wealth, economic freedom, political freedom, income inequality, rule of law and civil rights. Together these six societal qualities explain 66% of the variance in HLY in nations. Consideration of more variables in smaller nation sets yields R 2 values of .85 and more. Dispersion of happiness in particular adds 13% explained variance.
This correlation between HLY and common 'input' indicators shows that HLY measures something substantive and fits common sense notions of quality-of-life. Yet it also raises the question about its surplus value. If the two approaches to the measurement of quality-oflife in nations yield quite similar results, why then use this new output measure?
One reason is that not everything deemed required for a good life is really necessary. We saw this in the cases of income equality and social security. Secondly some of the things that are required today may loose relevance tomorrow. This is illustrated by the diminishing utility of wealth. Together this means that we better not focus on separate inputs, but rather measure final output.
Next there are practical reasons, HLY is more easily measured than current indexes of presumed quality-of-life and the concept of Happy-Life-Years is also easier to understand.
A look at appendix A shows that happiness and longevity tend to go together, in particular in the western countries where life if both long and happy. This raises the question whether we really need to combination of happiness and longevity. Why not simply suffice with the latter?
The answer is that happiness and longevity do not always parallel. People live rather short but fairly happy in 3 rd world countries like Bangladesh, India and Nigeria, while they live pretty long but unhappy in former 2 nd world nations such as Russia and Azerbaijan. Consequently the correlation is not high, r = +.38. Hence the sum tells more than its constituents.
Still one can object that the same HLY score may denote different combinations of happiness and longevity. As noted earlier, a same medium score on HLY may reflect three combinations: 1) moderate longevity and medium happiness, 2) a long but unhappy life, and 3) a short but very happy life. These are indeed different situations, but still we may want to reduce this diversity to one dimension. In that case, HLY provides a way to do so. The combination makes sense, since both average happiness and longevity reflect how well people thrive in a country. In fact the combination of these two output measures makes more sense that the adding up of input indicators, such as income per head and education. I have elaborated that point elsewhere (Veenhoven 2000, section 4) .
CONCLUSION
Quality-of-life in nations can be measured by the degree to which citizens life long and happily. The number of Happy-Life-Years differentiates well across nations and over time. This measure of 'apparent' quality-of-life is a good alternative to current indexes of 'assumed' quality-of-life such as the Human Development Index. Application of this measure in the present day world shows that the quality-of-life is highest in nations characterised by economic affluence, freedom and justice. Income equality and generous social security do not appear to be required for a long and happy life. (Veenhoven 1996) . The approach is summarized and new data are presented, now on 20 more nations and in time-trends.
DISCUSSION
2 This distinction between 'input' and 'output' has also been used to denote different levels of societal provisions, for instance government expenditures on housing as input and the number of rooms per capita as output (e.g. Boelhouwer & Stoop, 1999: 53) .
3 For a discussion of the adaptive functions of affect see Morris (1992) . Affect has only developed in species that can choose how and where, to live such faculties would be of little use for plants.
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NOTES
Observable manifestations
Presence of conditions deemed essential for a good life, such as:
• Economic affluence f.e. GNP
• Political freedom f.e. Legal rights
• Social equality f.e. Income equality
• Access to knowledge f.e. Literacy rate
Flourishing of citizens as apparent in:
• Good health Physical Mental
• Happiness
Comprehensive indicators
Various sum-scores:
• Human Development Index 
